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Abstract
Measuring legal change—i.e., change in the way that judges decide cases—presents
a vexing problem. In response to a change in the behavior of courts, plaintiffs and
defendants will change their patterns of filing and settling cases. Priest and Klein’s
(1984) selection model predicts that no matter how favorable or unfavorable the legal
standard is to plaintiffs, the rate at which plaintiffs prevail in litigation will not pre-
dictably change; thus, legal change cannot be measured with data on court outcomes.
In this paper, I extend the selection model to develop a methodology for measuring
legal change, even in the presence of selection effects. I apply this methodology to a
recent, high profile Supreme Court case, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. My model
generates novel predictions, which are confirmed in the data, and I find that Twombly
caused no legal change, even after accounting for possible selection effects.
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Becker, Omri Ben-Shahar, Emily Buss, Joe Cecil, Lee Epstein, Jonathan Hall, Cheryl Hubbard, Ashley
Keller, Bill Landes, Ethan Lieber, Anup Malani, Tom Miles, Emily Oster, Mark Phillips, Richard Posner,
Luke Threinen, Andrew Zuppann, and participants at the University of Chicago Law School Work-In-
Progress Workshop. I thank Lee Epstein, Bill Landes, and Richard Posner for providing me with their
dataset of published opinions on motions to dismiss. Dylan Benson, Tirsit Berhanu, Liz Chao, Helen Chen,
Jessica Dueck, and Georgia Sampedro provided invaluable assistance in preparing this dataset for analysis.
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1 Introduction
How does one measure legal change? There is of course a formal sense in which the law
changes every time Congress passes a new statute, or the Supreme Court decides a new case.
This paper, however, concerns itself with legal change in a different, more functional sense:
a change in the way judges decide cases. It is this latter sense in which legal change affects
the expectations that individuals form about the risks of liability for different activities, and
is thus the primary means by which the law influences human behavior.1 It is legal change
in this sense, therefore, that is of primary interest to the policymaker.
This poses the question whether a given Supreme Court opinion or new statute actually
changes how courts decide cases. To answer this question, we would like to see whether cases
that in the past had been decided one way are now being decided differently. The problem
is that this comparison requires us to hold fixed the set of litigated cases before and after
the potential law change. But in response to a legal change, plaintiffs and defendants may
change their litigation strategy, settling cases that previously would have been litigated, and
litigating cases that previously would have settled. The rate at which plaintiffs or defendants
prevail in litigation may not change, even after a sharp change in how courts decide cases.
This is the problem of measuring legal change.
Priest and Klein (1984) were the first to develop this argument. Their model essentially
argues that because trying a case is costly, parties have an incentive to settle before trial.
If the plaintiff and the defendant have similar beliefs about the expected outcome of the
trial, then they are both better off settling for (approximately) the expected amount of
damages and saving their attorney fees. It is only when the plaintiff and the defendant have
sharply divergent expectations about the litigation that settlement becomes impossible. And
1Holmes (1897) put it colorfully: “The reason why [law] is a profession, why people will pay lawyers to
argue for them or to advise them, is that in societies like ours the command of public force is intrusted to
the judges in certain cases . . . . People want to know under what circumstances and how far they will run
the risk of coming against what is so much stronger than themselves, and hence it becomes a business to
find out when this danger is to be feared.”
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since the parties’ expectations are most likely to diverge in “close” cases—cases where the
defendant is on the borderline between liability and non-liability—we should expect that the
cases that do go to trial will be close cases under whatever legal standard governs.2 Therefore,
Priest and Klein predict that (subject to important qualifications) plaintiffs will prevail
approximately 50 percent of the time in litigation and that (not subject to qualifications) a
change in a legal standard will have no predictable effect on the rate at which plaintiffs or
defendants prevail in litigation.
Take the recent Supreme Court case Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (550 U.S. 544
[2007]). In Twombly, the Supreme Court addressed the standard under which a judge decides
whether to dismiss a case based on the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint. This rule
applies in every federal civil case, and thus applies to approximately 250,000 newly filed
cases per year. The standard for dismissing a case had been announced in the 1957 Supreme
Court case Conley v. Gibson (355 U.S. 41 [1957]), and for fifty years, the Supreme Court
had never altered the standard. But in Twombly, the Supreme Court unexpectedly “retired”
language from Conley and announced a new standard that made it easier to dismiss a case.
There was an immediate uproar from the bar and legal academe. “No decision in recent
memory has generated as much interest and is of such potentially sweeping scope as the
Supreme Court’s decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.” Smith (2009). Countless
commentators criticized its (presumably) harmful effect on plaintiffs seeking relief in court.3
Bills were introduced in Congress to overturn the decision. Notice Pleading Restoration
Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009); Open Access to Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115,
111th Cong. (2009). Lawyers and academics testified that Twombly has had a “devastating
impact” on plaintiffs, particularly in civil rights cases. Schneider (2010).
But was Twombly in fact such a momentous legal change? For that matter, did it effect
2Hylton and Lin (p. 1) credit Holmes (1881, p. 127) as the first to argue this point: “Legal, like natural
divisions, however clear their general outline, will be found on exact scrutiny to end in a penumbra or
debatable land. This is the region of the jury, and only cases falling on this doubtful border are likely to be
carried far in court.”
3See Part 2.2 for citations.
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any legal change at all? How can we know? If the Priest and Klein model is right, we
might expect to see plaintiffs prevailing on a motion to dismiss about 50 percent of the time
before Twombly, and about 50 percent of the time after Twombly—even if Twombly radically
changed the pleading standard. In a sample of nearly 13,000 published decisions on motions
to dismiss, this is exactly what I find. See Table 1. And if the Priest and Klein model is
right, then our enterprise, the empirical measurement of legal change, is doomed.
Well, not quite. In this paper, I will argue that a refinement of the Priest and Klein (or
“selection”) model may allow us to distinguish empirically a change in a legal standard from
no change.4 This paper takes two initial steps toward that goal.
First, although styled “The Selection of Disputes for Litigation,” Priest and Klein (1984)
did not address the selection of disputes (e.g., car crashes or broken promises) for litigation
(i.e., filed lawsuits). Instead, Priest and Klein present a model of the selection of filed
lawsuits for trial. The literature to date has largely followed suit, either treating the set of
filed lawsuits as fixed and exogenous (e.g., Priest and Klein 1984; Waldfogel 1995; Siegelman
and Waldfogel 1999) or assuming that all suits with positive expected value are filed (e.g.,
Wittman 1985; Priest 1985; Siegelman and Donahue 1995).5 But the rate at which cases are
filed is an outcome of interest, and it is an empirical reality that many disputes are settled
before a lawsuit is ever filed. Hence, the first contribution of this paper is an application of
the selection model to filings.
Second, the Priest and Klein model distinguishes only between “trial” and “settlement,”
making no allowance for the stages of litigation that precede trial. There are at least two
points in the litigation process, prior to trial, at which the judge may decide the case in favor
4The original Priest and Klein model has survived virtually unchanged since it was first published twenty-
seven years ago. Hylton and Lin (2010) note that “[a]lthough the Priest and Klein hypothesis is widely cited
in the law and economics literature and has been tested empirically, it still lacks formal treatment.[ ] The
original Priest-Klein article provides an informal argument, as do later articles testing it.” Waldfogel (1995,
1998b) formalizes some aspects of the model; Hylton and Lin (2010) themselves formalize Wittman’s (1985)
version of the selection model. This is a testament to the model, as is the large empirical literature it has
spawned. (See Waldfogel [1998b] and Hylton and Lin [2010] for citations to this literature.)
5By positive expected value, I mean the expected judgment award to the plaintiff exceeds the plaintiff’s
expected litigation costs.
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of the plaintiff or the defendant. Early in the case, a defendant may file a motion to dismiss
(as in Twombly), and after discovery either party may file a motion for summary judgment.
Presumably, the selection process in the Priest and Klein model applies to such dispositive
motions as well.6 Surprisingly, however, virtually all of the empirical work on the Priest and
Klein model has focused on trials rather than other types of adjudication.7 No prior work
has directly addressed the interaction between the selection of disputes for filing and the
selection of filed lawsuits for adjudication. Thus, the second contribution of this paper is to
generalize the selection model to account for multi-stage litigation by nesting the process of
selecting lawsuits for adjudication within the process of selecting disputes for filing.
I will refer to this generalization of the selection model as the “nested selection model.”
In this model, the process of selection of filed lawsuits for litigation of a motion to dismiss is
nested within the larger process of the selection of disputes to become filed lawsuits. At each
stage of the dispute-resolution process, some disputes are resolved by a settlement between
the parties, while other advance to further litigation. The nested selection model attempts to
capture this dynamic. It not only replicates many of the predictions of the original selection
model, but generates addition predictions, which I validate empirically.
With this nested selection model, I return to the empirical problem of measuring legal
change. To hold the selection of disputes for filing fixed while allowing adjudication to
respond endogenously to a legal change, I exploit the fact that the stages of litigation (e.g.,
filing the suit, litigating a motion to dismiss) are separated in time by weeks or months.
Because of this fact, the nested selection model, unlike the original Priest and Klein model,
makes unambiguous predictions of the effects of a legal change on observable outcomes.
In particular, the nested selection model generates predictions that allow one to test
6Indeed, Priest and Klein (1984, p. 30) conjecture that their model “will explain the outcomes of prelim-
inary, but contested, issues of procedure or substance.”
7I will follow Waldfogel (1995) and call the resolution of a case through either dispositive motion or trial
“adjudication.” Note that studies such as Eisenberg (1991) and Waldfogel (1998a) compare plaintiff success
rates before trial and at trial, although they do not apply the selection model to the pre-trial stages of
litigation.
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for legal change, even in the presence of the selection effects described by the Priest and
Klein model. Importantly, the nested selection model is itself a testable model. Further,
one can test the predictions of the nested selection model using familiar empirical methods,
such as linear regression, and only a small innovation is required in the collection of court
data—collection of filing date information for all cases.
I then apply this theoretical framework to Twombly. As noted above, most commentators
have assumed that Twombly was a major legal change and therefore precipitated a rise in
both the rate at which motions to dismiss are granted and the total number of dismissals.
I will call this view the “conventional hypothesis.” A minority of commentators have taken
the position that Twombly caused at most a modest change in how judges decide cases,
and therefore its effects on dismissals should be modest. I will call this the “contrarian
hypothesis.” Neither of these views, nor the empirical literature attempting to measure the
effect of Twombly, accounts for selection effects in litigation.
In this paper, I examine the effects of Twombly, while accounting for selection effects with
the nested selection model. If Twombly did change how district courts decide cases, then the
nested selection model makes a very specific prediction: for cases filed before Twombly but
adjudicated after Twombly—those cases for which the selection of disputes for filing is held
fixed—the rate at which motions to dismiss are filed will rise, but the rate at which they are
granted will not change (much). This, in turn, implies that dismissals as a percent of all cases
will rise. I will call this the “selection/change hypothesis.” The nested selection model in
the absence of legal change, however, is indistinguishable from the contrarian view—nothing
changes.
To test these predictions, I bring two new datasets to bear. These datasets have two
important advantages over previously used datasets. First, they are very large. One is a
set containing information on outcomes for nearly 13,000 published district court opinions
ruling on motions to dismiss between May 21, 2006 and May 21, 2008 (a year before and
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after Twombly). The other is a set of administrative data on every federal civil lawsuit
filed since 1978. My analysis will focus on a subset of cases filed in the 2005-2008 period
(over 250,000 observations). Second, I have the filing date for every case in these datasets,
allowing me to estimate effects separately for cases filed before Twombly but adjudicated
after Twombly. Using these two datasets, I test the conventional, contrarian, and selection
hypotheses, and find no support for the view the Twombly has a large effect, under either
the conventional hypothesis or the selection/change hypothesis. Instead, the data support
the view that Twombly did not change the legal standards applied by district courts.
In sum, this paper makes two contributions. First, and most broadly, it provides an
approach to measuring legal change that accounts for the ways in which actors in the le-
gal system respond endogenously to changes in the legal environment. Second, and more
narrowly, it helps resolve a contentious debate about the most controversial civil procedure
decision in a generation: Bell Atlantic v. Twombly.
The balance of this paper is ordered as follows: Part 2 describes Twombly and briefly
addresses the large literature that it has spawned. In Part 3, I list the central empirical
predictions made about the effects of Twombly. I then develop the nested selection model
and define my methodology for testing the competing hypotheses. Part 4 describes the
two data sets I use, their advantages and their limitations. Part 5 presents my estimation
specifications and results. I find no evidence that Twombly marked a change in the law of
pleading. The most “sweeping” Supreme Court decision “in recent memory,” it appears, has
had little or no effect on how judges decide cases. Part 6 concludes with a discussion of the
limitations of and the opportunities presented by the nested selection model.
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2 The Story So Far
2.1 From Conley to Twombly
Civil actions in federal court begin with the filing of a complaint by the plaintiff. This
pleading “is the key to the courthouse door.” (Steinman 2010, p. 1295). Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 8(a) governs the content of a complaint: “A pleading that states
a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Once a plaintiff files a complaint, the defendant can file
a motion to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted” under
Rule 12(b)(6).8 If the court denies the motion to dismiss, the case proceeds to discovery and
perhaps settlement or trial. If the court grants the motion, the case is over; the plaintiff’s
only recourse is appeal to a higher court.
For 50 years, the standard governing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion seemed unassailable. Conley
v. Gibson (355 U.S. 41, 45-46 [1957]), described “the accepted rule that a complaint should
not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” On its
face, this statement seems to imply that a complaint would survive a motion to dismiss so
long as the plaintiff did not plead facts that contradicted his legal claim. While perhaps
never interpreted quite so literally, Conley reflected a liberal approach to the principle of
“notice pleading” embodied by the Federal Rules.9
So began five decades of apparent tranquility in the law of pleading. In this period,
“pleading standards were widely viewed as ‘well established’ and ‘relatively straightforward’”
8Herein, “motion to dismiss” refers specifically to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss; of course, there
are other grounds for dismissal, such as lack of jurisdiction or failure to prosecute the claim, which are not
relevant here.
9Though remote from my analysis, the story of the regime of “fact pleading” that preceded the adoption
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the development of simplified pleading systems, including the
Field Code in the 19th Century, that culminated in the adoption of the Rules in 1938 may be of interest
to the reader. For various accounts, see Marcus (1986, pp. 433-444); 550 U.S. at 573-576 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Stancil (2009, pp. 109-114); Campbell (2010, pp. 1196-1218); Dodson (2010, pp. 447-452).
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(Steinman 2010, p. 1295). Pleading was so well settled that “commentators lost interest
in pleading” (Marcus 1986, p. 434). And as recently as Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534
U.S. 506 (2002), and Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination
Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993), the Supreme Court had unanimously rejected efforts to require
pleading of specific facts, even in narrow categories of cases.10
And then, on May 21, 2007, the Supreme Court decided an antitrust dispute captioned
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (550 U.S. 544 [2007]). William Twombly and Lawrence
Marcus had sued the “Baby Bells”—the four Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (ILECs)
that control nearly all local telephone service in the United States—alleging a class-action
claim of conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act. Their complaint alleged that the ILECs
had engaged in “parallel conduct” to thwart competition and raise prices for local phone and
high-speed internet service. The factual allegations in support of this claim were essentially
the parallel conduct of each ILEC in resisting entry by new, competing carriers into its
market area, and in not attempting entry into its neighbors’ markets. (544 U.S. at 549-551.)
The Court began by holding that allegations of parallel conduct, even if taken to be true,
would not establish a claim under the Sherman Act. It then turned to the question whether
the complaint should therefore be dismissed. To the Court, this was the hard question. After
all, Conley did not require that the factual allegations of a complaint, if true, prove a legal
claim; it simply required that the allegations, if true, not disprove the plaintiff’s legal claim:
Conley v. Gibson [355 U.S. 41 (1957)] spoke . . . of ‘the accepted rule that a
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim
which would entitle him to relief. This ‘no set of facts’ language can be read
in isolation as saying that any statement revealing the theory of the claim will
10I should note that unlike the Supreme Court, the lower federal courts periodically made efforts to push
pleading standards higher. Marcus (1986) and Fairman (2003) document these efforts in detail. Fairman
argues, though, that after Leatherman and Swierkiewicz, the lower courts retreated from their more aggressive
interpretations of the pleading standard. See Fairman (2003, pp. 1008, 1018, 1025, 1030, 1034, 1040).
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suffice unless its factual impossibility may be shown from the face of the pleadings.
. . . On such a focused and literal reading of Conley’s ‘no set of facts,’ a wholly
conclusory statement of claim would survive a motion to dismiss whenever the
pleadings left open the possibility that a plaintiff might later establish some ‘set
of [undisclosed] facts’ to support recovery.
(544 U.S. at 561 (citations omitted).) Treating the absurdity of this result as self-evident, the
Court announced that “after puzzling the profession for 50 years, this famous observation has
earned its retirement.” (544 U.S. at 563.) In its place, the Court required that a complaint
plead facts “plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with)” the plaintiff’s legal claim.
(544 U.S. at 557.) It concluded: “we do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics,
but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Because the
plaintiffs here have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,
their complaint must be dismissed.” (544 U.S. at 570.)
The Supreme Court itself would reaffirm Twombly almost exactly two years later. On
May 18, 2009, it decided Ashcroft v. Iqbal (129 S. Ct. 1937 [2009]), which presented a
civil rights claim brought by an Arab Muslim detained by the FBI in the aftermath of
September 11, 2001. The Court elaborated on Twombly, saying, “Two working principles
underlie our decision in Twombly. First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of
the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do
not suffice. . . . Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a
motion to dismiss.” (Id. at 1949-50.)
The Court also noted that Twombly was not limited to antitrust cases, but rather “ex-
pounded the pleading standard for all civil actions.” (Id. at 1953 (internal quotation marks
omitted).) This confirmed the conclusion that both courts and academics had already
reached about the scope of Twombly : it applied to all cases. See Bone (2009, p. 881);
10
Hatamyar (2010, p. 555); Redish and Epstein (2008, p. 26).
2.2 The Aftermath
Twombly was a bombshell. The viability of Conley was not part of the question pre-
sented to the Supreme Court; it had not even been raised by the parties. Twombly struck
“[s]eemingly without warning” (Hatamyar 2010, p. 554) and “sent shockwaves through the
legal community—for academics, practitioners, and judges alike” (Steinman 2010, p. 1305
(citations omitted)).11
The response to Twombly was immediate. Almost overnight, it became a fixture in
judicial opinions,12 and after 50 years of near-dormancy, the scholarly literature on pleading
exploded.13 As Reinert (2010, p. 3) notes, a near-consensus emerged “among academic
observers that the Iqbal/Twombly pleading standard marks a sharp break with the past.”14
Most scholars view Twombly “as overturning fifty years of generous notice pleading practice,
and critics attack it as a sharp departure from the ‘liberal ethos’ of the Federal Rules, favoring
decisions ‘on the merits, by jury trial, after full disclosure through discovery.’” (Bone 2009,
p. 875.) Spencer (2008, p. 431) sums up the conventional wisdom: “Notice pleading is
dead.”
11Other characterizations include “out of the blue” (Epstein 2009, p. 4); “a startling move by the U.S.
Supreme Court” (Spencer 2008, p. 431); and “a surprising departure from ingrained federal pleading rules”
(Smith 2009, p. 1063).
12Twombly has been cited in judicial opinions tens of thousands of times and is already one of the most
cited decisions in the history of the United States. Steinman (2010, p. 1295 n.9) notes that “[a]s of March
2010, Twombly had been cited in nearly 24,000 federal decisions—already number seven of all time.” Ward
(2008, p. 893) notes that “Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on May
21, 2007, and has already been cited more than 9,400 times as of March 15, 2008.”
13Stancil (2009, pp. 137-138) writes: “Until recently, the scholarly literature on pleading standards was re-
markably thin, with only a few significant pieces written from the 1930s through the early 2000s. Widespread
scholarly interest in pleading is a remarkably recent phenomenon, tracing its birth to the Supreme Court’s
2007 opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.” For a litany of citations, see Steinman (2010, pp.
1296-1298 and nn.10-14).
14Other formulations include “a revolution in pleading ” (Schneider 2010, p. 527); a “drastic departure
from well-established pleading standards” (Hamburg and Koski 2010, p. 10); “a new era” (Steinman 2010,
p. 1310); “a sea change” (Hoffman 2008, p. 1235); “a major departure from the Court’s established pleading
jurisprudence” (Miller 2010, p. 16); and even a “subversion[ ] of law to achieve the restrictive ends of societal
elites” (Spencer 2010, p. 201).
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Whether this development is a good thing or a bad thing has been the center of con-
tentious debate. “Without question, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly [ ] ranks as one of the most
controversial decisions of the United States Supreme Court in recent years.” (Epstein 2009,
p. 2.) At base, normative arguments about Twombly stem from a single, empirical premise:
rightly or wrongly, Twombly will cause more cases to be dismissed—a lot more cases. Miller
(2010, pp. 21) sums up that “the perception among many practicing attorneys and com-
mentators is that the grant rate [for motions to dismiss] has increased, particularly in civil
rights cases, employment discrimination, private enforcement matters, class actions, and
proceedings brought pro se.”15
Although Twombly was an antitrust case, the greatest concerns raised have been about
its effect on civil rights plaintiffs. Reinert (2010) and others note the historical importance
of federal courts to civil rights claimants, as well as the particular difficulty that individuals
with claims such as employment discrimination will have pleading specific facts about the
defendant’s motives. Some argue that the need to plead facts establishing a “plausible” claim
will often prove an “impossible” (Kilaru 2010, p. 924) or “insurmountable” (Schnapper 2009;
Wasserman 2010, p. 178) barrier for civil rights plaintiffs. This has lead to predictions that
Twombly will disproportionately increase dismissals of civil rights claims (see, e.g., Ward
2008; Wasserman 2010) and that “the shift is undeniably big” (Schneider 2010).
Of course, there have been dissenting voices. Some scholars have argued that, as a
doctrinal matter, Twombly does not represent a sharp break with precedent (Epstein 2009;
Steinman 2010), or is only a modest change in doctrine (Bone 2009). These commentators go
on to predict that, consequently, the observed effect of Twombly will not be dramatic. This
contrarian view has its share of adherents outside the academe. Some practitioners such as
Andrew Pincus (2010), an attorney at Mayer Brown, have argued that Twombly “is less a
15In most of the literature, this prediction is perhaps so obvious that it goes unstated; but many make
it explicit. See Ward 2008, p. 916 (“Post-Twombly, a defendant would predict a higher rate of success on
[a Rule 12(b)(6)] motion.”); Hannon 2008, p. 1814 (“Generally, any substantive alteration to the pleading
standard would have an effect on the dismissal rate under 12(b)(6).”).
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sea change as it is a recognition of what was already going [on] out there in the trenches.”
What is remarkable about this debate is that despite widespread disagreement about the
meaning of Twombly as a matter of legal doctrine, all sides of the debate (implicitly) agree
that whether or not Twombly worked a major change in the law will ultimately be resolved
as an empirical matter: we can measure its effect on the law of civil procedure by measuring
how it changes the rate at which cases are dismissed. In other words, this debate implicitly
defines legal change as this paper defines it: a change in “the law” is a change in how district
courts decide cases. Many more dismissals implies the law changed; no change in dismissals
means there was no change in the law. Under this definition of legal change, a new Supreme
Court precedent may cause legal change—or it may not. With this notion of legal change in
mind, scholars have rushed to compare dismissal rates among published cases decided before
and after Twombly. (See Hannon 2008; Seiner 2009, 2010; Hatamyar 2010.) Others call for
further empirical work. (See Hoffman 2008; Wasserman 2010; Miller 2010.) I now turn to a
brief discussion of the existing empirical literature.
2.3 The Evidence to Date
A small literature has emerged that attempts to test whether Twombly has led to an increase
in motions to dismiss being granted, with particular attention to civil rights claims. These
studies are virtually the first attempts to study pleading and motions to dismiss empirically.
Chiorazzi et al. (1988, p. 120) compile a massive annotation of 316 empirical studies in civil
procedure, but note that “there are no studies in pleading per se, perhaps because of the
advent of modern notice pleading.”16 Indeed, For the period before 2008, I know of only one
empirical study directly addressing the use of motions to dismiss (Willging 1989).17
Hannon (2008) is the first empirical study of Twombly. Hannon looks at district court
opinions published on Westlaw. He searches Westlaw for every case that cited Twombly
16By way of comparison, they found five studies on the use of telephonic conferences in civil litigation.
17A second, Connolly and Lombard (1980), contains some data related to motions to dismiss.
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in the context of a motion to dismiss from June-December 2007, and every case that cited
Conley during most of the period June 2006-September 2007.18 His final sample includes
3,287 cases. Comparing the cases citing Conley with the set of cases citing Twombly, he
finds that among civil rights cases, the grant rate for motions to dismiss jumps from 41.7
percent in the Conley group to 52.9 percent in the Twombly group. For all other cases, the
difference is meager: 36.9 percent before versus 37.4 percent after Twombly.
Three subsequent academic studies have followed Hannon’s methodology and reached
similar results, although they varied the dates covered and used smaller samples of cases.
Hatamyar (2010) and Seiner (2009, 2010) conclude that at least in the context of civil rights
claims, Twombly is leading to more dismissals.19
These studies on the effects of Twombly are quick to acknowledge that inferences drawn
from them must be qualified by the limitations of their data and methodology. First, the
estimated effects are relatively small and none are statistically significant.20 Second, any
study relying on opinions ruling on motions to dismiss can at best quantify only the share
of motions to dismiss granted, not the overall rate at which filed cases are dismissed. Third,
nearly all the studies rely on opinions published in Westlaw, when in fact only a fraction of
all district court orders are published. See Hoffman, Izenman and Lidicker (2007); Lizotte
(2007). It is not known the extent to which the selection of decisions for publication may
affect the representativeness of the samples drawn from Westlaw. Fourth, a related concern
is that focusing only on cases citing Conley or Twombly, rather than all cases ruling on
motions to dismiss, introduces an additional selection bias.21
18He does not explain why he includes cases decided after May 21, 2007 in his Conley sample, nor does
he address the fact that cases after May 21, 2007 may cite both Twombly and Conley.
19A survey by the FJC provides some qualitative evidence of little effect. Willging and Lee (2010) survey
both plaintiffs’ and defense attorneys across a range of practice areas and report that “[m]ost interviewees
indicated that they had not seen any impact of the two cases in their practice.”
20Hannon (2008) reports one statistically significant result, but this is due to a specification error. A
corrected regression on the same data (not reported, on file with author) yields no significant effect.
21District courts ruling on a motion to dismiss may cite other Supreme Court cases, precedent from the
circuit courts, or even other district court opinions. Given the age of Conley during the sample periods in
the studies above, district court opinions choosing to cite Conley directly, rather than any of the hundreds
or thousands of more recent (and equally controlling) precedents, are unlikely to be a representative sample
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The most authoritative study to date is Cecil et al. (2011), a large study of docket
records from a sample of federal district courts by researchers at the Federal Judicial Center
(FJC). It compares cases from 2005-2006 with cases from 2009-2010, bracketing an interval
during which both Twombly and Iqbal were decided. Using a dataset of motion to dismiss
filings, Cecil et al. (2011) find that motions to dismiss were filed in a larger share of cases
in 2009-2010 (6.2 percent) than in 2005-2006 (4.0 percent). Using a second database of
rulings on motions to dismiss, they find no change in the rate at which motions to dismiss
are granted. Because of differences between the two samples, Cecil et al. (2011) could not
estimate whether the fraction of all filed cases terminated on a motion to dismiss had risen.
None of these studies finds a statistically significant increase in the rate at which motions
to dismiss are granted after Twombly. This is consistent with no change in the legal standards
applied by district courts after Twombly. It is also consistent, however, with Twombly
inaugurating a higher standard for motions to dismiss, and the selection of cases responding
endogenously in ways that leaves unchanged the rate at which motions to dismiss are granted.
These studies do not address the question of how to measure the effect of Twombly if there
are significant effects of selection of disputes into litigation.
3 Legal Change and the Nested Selection Model
Both the praise and the scorn directed at Twombly are a consequence of the belief that
Twombly has, in fact, raised the bar for pleading. But has it? The competing accounts in
Part 2 offer contrasting predictions. The conventional view proceeds from the premise that
Twombly has raised the pleading standard and reaches these conclusions:
Prediction 1. Twombly will (significantly) increase the fraction of motions to dismiss that
are granted under Rule 12(b)(6).
of rulings prior to Twombly. For cases citing Twombly, this bias may be less of a problem, given its recent
vintage.
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Prediction 2. Twombly will (significantly) increase the fraction of filed cases that are dis-
missed under Rule 12(b)(6).
As discussed above, the conventional account suggests that the effects of Twombly will be
largest among civil rights cases, where evidence of elements such as discriminatory intent may
not be available to plaintiffs absent discovery. Because discovery is generally not available
until after a ruling on a motion to dismiss, the argument goes, many civil rights plaintiffs will
be left without the ability to show that their claim is “plausible” as required by Twombly.
Thus, for these hypotheses the conventional account would add the following corollary:
Corollary. The effects above will be (significantly) greater for civil rights cases.
The contrarian view, of course, rests on the belief that Twombly did not, in fact, change
the pleading standard much. Hence, advocates of this view argue that any effects will be
quite modest.
As noted above, these views do not account for selection effects predicted by Priest and
Klein. In this Part, I will develop what I call a nested selection model, which formalizes and
extends the original model described in Priest and Klein (1984). With this model, I will then
generate testable predictions distinct from both the conventional view and the contrarian
view.
3.1 The Nested Selection Model
I present a more formal exposition of the nested selection model in the Model Appendix.
Here I present the model in an informal fashion. Consider the set of all disputes of a given
type (e.g., car crashes); these disputes may or may not become filed lawsuits. Let’s say we
have a measure of “quality” for each dispute, such that disputes with quality above some
threshold level will result in a plaintiff victory at trial (if there is a trial), and in disputes
with quality below that threshold, the defendant will prevail. If we apply the logic of Priest
and Klein to the selection of disputes for filing, we would predict that for cases far above or
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below the victory standard, the parties will settle rather than litigate, because they agree
that the dispute has a foregone conclusion. The quality of filed cases will tend to be close
to the victory standard, because those are the disputes for which the parties are least likely
to agree on the result. Filed cases with quality that is high or low relative to that standard
will be few.
Now consider a different legal standard, the pleading standard. In the terms of the
selection model, the pleading standard will be a fairly low standard relative to the victory
standard. Thus, there will be relatively few filed cases that are close to the pleading standard.
But if we apply the logic of the selection model to pleadings, the model predicts that only
cases close to the pleading standard will have a motion to dismiss (in other cases, the
parties will agree that the outcome of a motion to dismiss is a foregone conclusion, and act
accordingly). This in turn means that relatively few cases will have litigated motions to
dismiss (and therefore few cases will be dismissed). Figure 1 illustrates this. The dashed
line indicates the distribution of the quality of filed cases, relative to the victory standard V .
The pleading standard is S. The distribution of cases with a motion to dismiss is indicated
by the solid line. Of this small group, those below the standard are dismissed. (This is the
shaded area in Figure 1.)
I will call this model of (1) the selection of disputes for filing and (2) the selection of filed
lawsuits for litigation of a motion to dismiss the “nested selection model.” In Figure 1, the
distribution of litigated motions to dismiss is literally nested within (and almost a miniature
version of) the distribution of filed cases—itself a selected subset of the distribution of all
disputes. Within the set of filed cases, a small subset, with case quality centered slightly
above the pleading standard S, will litigate a motion to dismiss.22 Within this subset,
defendants will prevail somewhat less than half the time. (The shaded area in Figure 1
represents the set of dismissed cases.) Already this model generates two predictions about
22Because the distribution of filed cases has most of its mass near the victory standard V , the distribution
of cases with motions to dismiss will not be symmetrically distributed around S, but will be shifted slightly
toward V . Hence, more than 50 percent of cases with motions to dismiss will have quality above S.
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pleadings practice: first, motions to dismiss will be filed in a relatively small fraction of cases;
and second, motions to dismiss will be granted a large fraction (but less than half) the time.
Without the context of the nested selection model, these two predictions are surprising,
or even contradictory: if a defendant, at relatively low cost, can get maybe a one-in-three
chance of dismissing a lawsuit (that otherwise could be very costly), why would so few even
bother to file a motion to dismiss? Yet the available data tend to confirm these predictions.
First, very few motions to dismiss are filed. Willging (1989) reviews three sets of district
court docket records, and finds rulings on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss in only 6 to 12
percent of cases. And in a massive study of federal district court docket records, Cecil et al.
(2011) find motions to dismiss filed in only 4 to 6.2 percent of cases.23
Second, courts frequently dismiss cases in response to motions to dismiss. In a sample of
district courts, Willging (1989) finds that in rulings on motions to dismiss, the courts would
grant the motion and dismiss the case 18 to 51 percent of the time. Cecil et al. (2011) find
that between 23 and 28 percent of all rulings on motions to dismiss result in the termination
of the lawsuit within 90 days. It is important to note here that the grant rate for motions
to dismiss is usually measured in terms of whether the defendant obtained her requested
relief, even if only part of the plaintiff’s case was dismissed. These grant rates tend to be
higher—in the order of 50 percent. See Willging (1989); Cecil et al. (2011). The nested
selection model, however, abstracts away from partial dismissals and models only motions
to dismiss the entirety of plaintiff’s case. For this reason, I report numbers for motions to
dismiss that result in the case being terminated.
My data is consistent with these findings as well. As noted above, the fraction of opinions
granting a motion to dismiss in my data is approximately 50 percent. See Table 1. Of these,
about 70 percent resulted in the case terminating within 90 days; all told, 34 percent of cases
23The numbers presented by Cecil et al. (2007) should be taken as a conservative estimate; their sample
was limited to motions to dismiss filed within 90 days of the suit being filed. This scope should capture
most, but not all, motions to dismiss.
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in the sample were terminated within 90 days of a motion to dismiss being granted.24 And
yet, my administrative data indicates that perhaps only 2 percent of all cases are terminated
by a motion to dismiss. See Table 3. This is consistent with Willging’s finding that the
fraction of all sampled cases dismissed varied from 1 to 6 percent.25
3.2 A Methodology for Measuring Legal Change
We now have the nested selection model. It generates some novel predictions that are
consistent with observed facts (such as the rates at which motions to dismiss are granted)
that otherwise would be difficult to explain. It also gives us some leverage on the problem
of measuring legal change.
If one can hold the distribution of filed cases (the dashed line) fixed, but at the same
time raise the pleading standard (to S ′), then the nested selection model predicts that
more cases will have motions to dismiss, and thus more cases will be dismissed. See Figure
2. The original selection model could not reach this prediction for two reasons. First,
because it did not apply the logic of selection to the filing of lawsuits, it did not recognize
that the distribution of quality among filed cases would be concentrated around the victory
standard. However, this is the essential logic of the Priest and Klein model—the choice to
file is dependent on the parties not settling first. Second, in the original selection model, it is
impossible to hold the distribution of filed cases fixed; when the pleading standard changes,
the set of filed cases (the dashed line in Figure 2) may change, and in an unpredictable way.
This is because in the original selection model, all the stages of dispute resolution—pre-
filing settlement, filing, motions to dismiss, discovery, summary judgment, and trial—occur
simultaneously in a single period. Thus, changes in legal rules occur simultaneously with
changes in the composition of filed cases.
24Focusing only on the categories of cases included in the AO Data analysis (see Part 4.1) lowers the rate
of termination within 90 days to 23 percent. See the Data Appendix for details on data processing.
25Because of their methodology, Cecil et al. (2011) were not able to directly estimate the fraction of all
sampled cases that were dismissed.
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The empirical reality, however, is that litigation is time consuming and the stages of
litigation are often spread over months or years. Thus, for any given change in a legal rule,
there will be cases for which choices in the first stage (settlement versus filing) occur under
the old legal rule, but choices in the second stage (litigating a motion to dismiss) occur under
the new legal rule. Thus, in applying the nested selection model, I can hold the distribution
of filed cases fixed, even as the distribution of motions to dismiss changes in response to a
new pleading standard. I do this by looking at cases in which the complaint was filed before
Twombly (and thus the filing decision was not affected by Twombly) but a motion to dismiss,
if any, was litigated after Twombly (and thus the motion to dismiss decision was affected by
Twombly).
Figure 2 illustrates this comparison. The distribution of filed lawsuits is held constant,
but the dismissal standard increases from S to S ′. The new set of cases with a motion to
dismiss will contain many more cases because its mean, S ′, is closer to the mean of Y . From
this, the nested selection model generates two unambiguous empirical predictions. In for the
“short run,” i.e., holding the distribution of filed cases fixed after the (ostensibly) new legal
rule is announced, we predict the following: First, the share of all motions to dismiss that are
granted will not change (much). Second, the share of all filed cases that are dismissed will
rise. Together, these predictions constitute what I will call the “selection/change hypothesis,”
which is the joint hypothesis that the nested selection model is operating and that Twombly
effected a (significant) change in the legal standard.
There is also the “selection/no change hypothesis,” which is the joint hypothesis that the
nested selection model is operating and that Twombly was not a (significant) legal change.
This hypothesis yields predictions identical to the “contrarian” hypothesis, i.e., no significant
changes in either grant rates for motions to dismiss or total numbers of dismissals.
In Table 2, I array these predictions against the predictions of the conventional hypothesis
and the contrarian hypothesis. The conventional and contrarian views implicitly constitute
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joint hypotheses as well; both assume the absence of selection effects. Effects on the motion
to dismiss grant rate distinguish the conventional hypothesis from the other two; effects (or
lack thereof) on the rate at which cases are dismissed distinguishes the contrarian hypothesis
from the other two. These predicted effects are for the “short run”—i.e., for cases filed before
Twombly but in which any motion to dismiss would have been litigated after Twombly.
In short, the original Priest and Klein model yielded the result that it is impossible to
detect the effects of legal change in litigation outcomes. This paper shows that it is possible
to identify observable effects of a change in a legal standard, even in a world in which the
selection model operates.26 I now turn to the data with which I will test these predictions.
4 Data
I have compiled two large datasets of federal district court cases. They are notable for two
reasons. First, together they form the largest collection of case information yet brought to
bear on the question whether Twombly has had an effect. Second, although other empirical
studies of legal change have used either administrative data or opinions data, as I do here,
prior studies in general were not able to configure their data in a way that permitted drawing
inferences about changes in a legal standard under the conditions of the selection model. As
I show above, the selection model generates unambiguous predictions only for a “short run”
sample of cases, cases that are filed under the old standard but decided under the new
standard. This requires sorting cases by filing date, and distinguishing those cases filed
before the (apparent) legal change but decided in relevant part after the legal change.
Datasets of published opinions, however, inevitably are organized by the date of the
opinion, not the date of case filing. (It is not even clear that a set of published opinions,
26Under some circumstances, this methodology also allow us to test the nested selection model. Support
for the conventional hypothesis would undermine the nested selection model; support for the selection/change
hypothesis would tend to refute the conventional hypothesis. But as all models make the same prediction
(no effects) in the absence of a legal change, I cannot distinguish the contrarian view from the selection/no
change hypothesis in the data.
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standing alone, could be organized by filing date.) The administrative data, which is collected
and published by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AO), likewise is
organized by the (fiscal) year in which each case was terminated. The AO data, unlike
published opinions, does provide filing dates for all cases. Thus, by combining all available
annual datasets of terminations with the most recent data on pending cases, I create a
database constituting a census of all cases filed on any given date (since 1978). Prior studies
have relied on limited sets of annual datasets of terminated cases; this prevents reconfiguring
the dataset into even a representative sample (let alone census) of cases filed on any given
date.
To organize my dataset of published opinions by filing date, I merge it with my admin-
istrative data. To do this requires matching each opinion to a case in the AO data, keeping
in mind that a case may have more than one published opinion (or, more likely, none at all),
and that, conversely, a single opinion may decide motions pending in several (or dozens or
hundreds of) related cases. To do this, I note that each case filed in the federal system is
assigned, at filing, a “docket number,” which is essentially a seven-digit serial number. Each
federal district court is subdivided into one or more “offices,” and within each office, the
docket number is a unique identifier for every case ever filed. For every federal civil case,
its district, office, and docket numbers together form a unique ID. Equally important, every
published district court opinion contains in its case caption the name of its district, the
office, and the docket number(s) of the case. By collecting and processing this information,
I match filing dates to my opinion data.27
4.1 Administrative Data
The AO collects information on every civil case terminated in the federal court system and
releases public-use versions of this data annually (on a fiscal year basis). The AO collects,
27These and other data processing steps are described in greater detail in the Data Appendix.
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among other things, information on the following aspects of each civil case: the circuit,
district, and office in which it was filed; the docket number under which it was filed; the date
of filing and the date (if any) of termination; the “nature of suit,” which is the category of
legal claim (e.g., personal injury, breach of contract) chosen by the plaintiff when filing the
suit; and the disposition of the suit (e.g., judgment on a jury verdict).28
The first year for which complete data is available is fiscal year 1979 (beginning July 1,
1978); the most recent year available is fiscal year 2009 (ending September 30, 2009). The
AO has also released data on all civil cases pending as of December 31, 2008. Together,
these datasets constitute a census of all federal civil cases filed or terminated from July 1,
1978 to December 31, 2008 (and all cases terminated through September 30, 2009), amount-
ing to about 8 million observations. I will refer to this data (and subsets thereof) as the
“administrative data” or “AO data.”
The most relevant subset period for purposes of this paper are the cases filed from
approximately 2005 through 2008. In this subset, I exclude several categories of data in
order to avoid the excessive effects of outliers. These categories, and all processing of the
AO Data, are described in fuller detail in the Data Appendix. Although I believe this subset
of the data is the best configuration of the data for purposes of the questions posed, it is
worth noting that none of these results reported herein are sensitive to any of the exclusions
listed above.
Summary statistics for this slice of the AO Data appear in Table 3. One important fact
jumps from this table. In the aggregate, the rates of dismissal before and after Twombly
appear to be identical. If Twombly has changed courts’ willingness to dismiss cases, its effect
is being masked by other factors.
28The AO uses this data to generate aggregate statistics about total case filings, terminations, and other
information, which it publishes annually. See http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics.aspx. Also, the AO Data
have been used in a large number of papers over the years, although most studies have relied on the published
aggregate statistics rather than the underlying microdata. Eisenberg and Schlanger (2003, nn.2-17) and
Hadfield (2005, n. 5) collect dozens such citations.
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4.2 Opinions Data
Lee Epstein, William M. Landes, and Richard A. Posner have created a dataset of information
on all federal district court opinions ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion that were published on
Westlaw during the two-year period around Twombly (May 21, 2006 to May 21, 2008). This
dataset includes, among other things, information on the circuit and district in which the
case was litigated, the month and year of the ruling, and indicators for whether the motion
to dismiss was granted in full and for whether the case involved a civil rights claim. To these
fields I added information on the office in which the case was filed, the docket number of
the case, and the date of the ruling. After processing this data (which I describe in detail
in the Data Appendix), this dataset contains 12,717 unique observations. I will refer to this
dataset as the “opinions data.” Summary statistics for the Opinions Data appear in Table
1. Again, the summary statistics reveal little change in dismissals after Twombly.
4.3 A Note about Limitations of the Data
These two datasets differ in the questions they can answer. The AO Data contains no
information on whether the defendant filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Thus, the AO Data
cannot address what fraction of cases involve motions to dismiss, or what fraction of such
motions are granted. It can address what fraction of all cases are dismissed under Rule
12(b)(6) (i.e., Hypothesis 2). Conversely, published opinions ruling on a motion to dismiss
only exist for cases in which a party made a motion to dismiss. Thus, a sample of published
opinions ruling on motions to dismiss can indicate the fraction of motions to dismiss granted
(i.e., Hypothesis 1), but not the share of cases in which such a motion is filed.
These data sets address many of the limitations of existing studies. First, their huge
sample sizes allow me to draw inferences with considerable precision. Second, while the
Opinions Data, like earlier studies, can use rulings on motions to dismiss to test Prediction
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1, the Administrative Data can test Prediction 2, which has not yet been tested.29 Third,
while the Opinions Data relies on published opinions, and thus may be subject to publication
bias, the AO Data is a census of all cases.30 Fourth, unlike all samples of published opinions
in earlier studies, the Opinions Data includes all rulings on motions to dismiss, regardless of
whether Conley or Twombly was cited by the judge.
Nonetheless, imperfections remain. First, neither the Opinions Data nor the AO Data
provides information on how many motions to dismiss were filed. A rise in the number
of motions to dismiss filed would be another likely effect of Twombly. Cecil et al. (2011)
report a higher rate of filings of motions to dismiss in 2010 than 2006, which suggests that
Twombly or Iqbal may have had an this kind of effect. Second, as Burbank (2004, p. 579)
notes, “the AO does not exist to serve the interests of the research community, let alone of
individual researchers, but rather those of the federal judiciary.” Its purpose is to assist the
AO in allocating resources to the federal districts, and the organization and coding of the
case records reflects this purpose. Thus, while much of the data is organized based on legally
significant categories (such as the basis for federal jurisdiction, or the nature of suit), some
is not. Most importantly for my purposes, the disposition field does not distinguish between
the two types of motions by which a case can be terminated on the merits before trial: the
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and the Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. Both fall
into the disposition category “Judgment on motion before trial.”31
To address this concern, I divide all cases coded as “Judgment on motion before trial”
into two groups, based on the duration of the case at the time of termination and the
prevailing party. I deem cases with durations of at least 45 and less than 225 days, and for
which the prevailing party was the defendant (or prevailing party information was missing),
29Recall that Prediction 1 states that Twombly will increase the fraction of motions to dismiss that are
granted under Rule 12(b)(6); and Prediction 2 states that Twombly will increase the fraction of filed cases
that are dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).
30The FJC has identified only one case (in the District of Oregon in 1987) that existed but which was not
documented in AO Data.
31This category may also capture Rule 12(c) motions, which are essentially equivalent to Rule 12(b)(6)
motions, but appear to be much less frequent.
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to be terminated on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion; I create the dummy variable dismissal and
set it equal to one for these cases. Cases of the same duration, but in which the plaintiff
prevailed, may be Rule 12(c) dispositions or types of judgments (such as defaults). I deem
cases with durations of 225 days or more to be terminated on a Rule 56 motion. I chose
these boundaries to correspond approximately to the minimum and maximum amounts of
time from filing of a complaint to disposition of a motion to dismiss in what might be a
typical case.32 This time range is consistent with findings of a study of docket records in
eight district courts, which found that average times to ruling varied widely across districts,
but the district averages all fell in the range of 63 to 176 days. See IAALS (2009); Kourlis
and Singer (2009). I also test this duration range by comparing the dismissal and summary
judgment rates it generates against FJC studies that have calculated Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal
and Rule 56 summary judgment rates for specific years and districts. See Willging (1989);
Cecil et al. (2007). The Data Appendix details the methodology and results; in short, the
rates generated are comparable for both categories. These precise boundaries are, of course,
arbitrary, but the results below are not sensitive to adjustments to the bounds.
4.4 A Note about Attenuation Bias
Finally, I note an issue of measurement that is particularly implicated when estimating
treatment effects over short time frames. If actors anticipate a future legal change, their
behavior may begin to change in response to the new legal rule before the rule is even
implemented. (For a treatment of this issue, see Malani and Reif [2010].) In the case
at hand, one could imagine that district courts, anticipating Twombly, began to increase
dismissals shortly before the decision, recognizing that their rulings would not be reviewed
on appeal until after Twombly. This will have the effect of attenuating any measured effect
of Twombly, by shrinking the difference in outcomes before and after that decision.
32As a default, the defendant has 20 days to file a motion to dismiss (from the date the complaint is served;
see Rule 12(a)(1)), and a court may take between one and six months to rule.
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Fortunately, anticipation effects appear not to be a concern here. First, as noted above,
Twombly was a surprise; the standard for pleading was not even raised by the parties to the
case. Second, the data reveal no noticeable short-run shifts in filings or dismissals in advance
of Twombly.
5 Results
I now present my estimation specifications and regression results for each of the predictions
of the hypotheses summarized in Table 2.
5.1 Prediction 1: Motion to Dismiss Grant Rate
The first prediction of the conventional view is that the percentage of motions to dismiss
that are granted will rise after Twombly. The contrarian hypothesis predicts no (significant)
change. The selection/change hypothesis predicts no change. Thus, prediction 1 allows one
to distinguish between the conventional hypothesis, on the one hand, and the contrarian and
selection/change hypotheses, on the other. By itself, it cannot distinguish the contrarian
hypothesis from the selection/change hypothesis.
To test this predictions, I use the opinions data. Because my focus is the “short run,” I
include only cases filed before May 22, 2007 (the date Twombly was decided). Motions to
dismiss decided before May 22, 2007 represent the control group; those decided after May 22,
2007 represent the treatment group. I employ a linear probability model with the following
specification:
Grantedi = α + β · Twomblyi + γ · Civil Rightsi + δi + εi (1)
Granted is an indicator for whether the motion to dismiss was granted in whole. Twombly is
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an indicator for the opinion being decided after Twombly ; βˆ therefore estimates the effect of
Twombly. Civil Rights is an indicator for a civil rights case, and δ is a vector of circuit fixed
effects. I also run regressions restricted only to civil rights cases, as well as logit regressions
(reporting marginal effects). All standard errors are clustered at the district level.
Table 4 presents my regression results. Nowhere is the coefficient on Twombly statistically
significant, and the point estimates are all very small in magnitude relative to the overall rate
of granting motions to dismiss, which is essentially 50 percent. 33 Notably, if I do not restrict
the sample to the “short run,” but include all cases in the Opinions Data, including cases
filed after Twombly, the effect of Twombly remains insignificant. And Cecil et al. (2011)
reach nearly identical results using data for an even longer-run window: 2006-2010. They
find that the rate at which motions to dismiss were granted (without leave to amend) did
not change significantly between 2006 and 2010.
Of course, to say that the effect is not statistically different from zero is not to say that
the effect is zero. One might be concerned that Twombly had a positive effect on the rate
at which motions to dismiss are granted, but I cannot detect this effect due to an imprecise
estimate. To address this concern, I also report the results of a “power analysis” that asks,
what is the smallest null hypothesis of the effect of Twombly that the data reject? In other
words, can we reject a null hypothesis that the effect of Twombly was an increase of (at
least) 5 percent in the rate at which motions to dismiss are granted? Can we reject the null
that Twombly had an effect of at least a 3 percent? How about a 1 percent increase?
As it turns out, my results are fairly precise. In Table 4, I report the lowest positive
effect of Twombly that the data reject at the 5 percent level.34 For all cases, the hypothesis
that Twombly increased the rate at which motions to dismiss are granted by 1.27 percent
is rejected. For civil rights cases, the hypothesis that Twombly increased the rate at which
33A difference-in-difference specification (not reported, available from author) in which Civil Rights is
interacted with Twombly to measure the differential effect of Twombly on civil rights cases also finds no
effect.
34Here I employ a one-tailed test. The question posed is whether the effect of Twombly is at least as great
as the null supposes.
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motions to dismiss are granted by 1.72 percent is rejected. This result casts doubt on the
conventional view.
5.2 Prediction 2: Dismissals as a Fraction of All Filings
The second prediction of the conventional view is that dismissals (cases terminated on a
motion to dismiss) will rise as a share of all cases after Twombly. The contrarian hypothesis
predicts no (significant) change. The selection/change hypothesis predicts a rise in dismissals.
Prediction 2 allows one to distinguish between the contrarian hypothesis, on the one hand,
and the conventional and selection/change hypotheses, on the other. Predictions 1 and 2
together allow one to separate these three hypotheses.
To test this prediction, I use the administrative data. I employ a linear probability model
with the following specification:
Dismissedi = α + β · Twomblyi + γi + δi + εi (2)
Dismissed is an indicator for whether the case was dismissed as defined in Part 4 above.
Twombly is an indicator for the case being in the later group (i.e., litigation of a motion to
dismiss occurring after Twombly); βˆ therefore estimates the effect of Twombly. There are
two sets of fixed effects: γi is a vector of nature-of-suit fixed effects, and δi is a vector of
circuit fixed effects.35 I also run regressions restricted only to civil rights cases, as well as
logit regressions (reporting marginal effects). All standard errors are clustered at the district
level.
I include cases filed April 6, 2006 to May 21, 2006 and cases filed April 6, 2007 to May 21,
2007. All cases in this sample were filed before Twombly ; thus this sample holds the selection
of disputes into filed cases fixed. The former group litigated their motions to dismiss before
35Equation (2) has a full vector of nature-of-suit fixed effects, which Equation (1) has only a civil rights
nature-of-suit dummy. This is because the Opinions Data contains only the single nature-of-suit category.
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Twombly, while the latter group litigated their cases after Twombly (May 21 is 45 days after
April 6). Thus, in the latter group of cases, the litigation of motions to dismiss may have
endogenously responded to Twombly. This “short run” sample allows me to distinguish
between the selection/change hypothesis and the contrarian (and selection/no change) view.
Table 5 presents my results of Prediction 2, including all cases. I present separate results
for civil rights cases in Table 6. None of the estimated effects of Twombly are statistically
significant, and the point estimates are extremely small in magnitude.
I then test the power of this empirical specification by determining the smallest positive
effect that the data can reject. As Tables 5 and 6 indicate, my results are quite precise. In
all specifications, I can reject a null hypothesis of a 0.4 percent effect—i.e., the hypothesis
that at least 1 in 250 cases was affected by Twombly. Also notable, a “longer run” sample of
cases filed up to two years before Twombly and up to a year after Twombly (not reported,
available from author), yields virtually identical results.
One potential concern with this estimation approach is that it is possible that in the
wake of Twombly, courts began to take longer to decide motions to dismiss, and by fixing
the time window for a dismissal (at 45-224 days), I have biased estimates of the effect of
Twombly downwards. If this is happening, we should expect to see post-Twombly dismissal
rates rise relative to pre-Twombly rates if we lengthen the time window for dismissals, and
we should also expect to see the average time from filing to dismissal rise after Twombly.
Neither of these patterns appears in the data. See Table 7. In sum, the empirical test of
Prediction 2 rejects both the conventional view and the selection/change hypothesis.
6 Conclusion
The empirical study of legal change within the courts presents a vexing problem. There is no
doubt that the cases adjudicated by courts comprise a highly selected sample of all disputes;
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because of this, Priest and Klein (1984) argue, a change in a legal standard as employed by
the courts will have no predictable effect on observable outcomes in litigation.
The Twombly case presents a perfect example of this problem. While traditional doctrinal
analysis of the case has led scholars to divergent views on whether it marks a significant
change in the law governing pleading, both sides of the debate agree that its effect on the
law should be inferable from its effect on practice in the district courts. Yet the original
selection model of Priest and Klein would predict no change in the rate at which cases are
dismissed, even if Twombly raised the bar for pleadings. If so, empirical study of the courts
cannot shed light on the significance of Twombly.
In this paper, I show that it is possible both to account for selection effects in litigation
and empirically measure the effects of legal change on the courts. I begin the project of
generalizing and extending the selection model to account for multiple stages of litigation
and to make the problem of measuring legal change, in the presence of selection effects,
tractable. I show that fairly weak assumptions lead to a refinement of the selection model,
which I call the nested selection model. This, in turn, generates new predictions about
the prevalence and success rates of motions to dismiss; these predictions are borne out
empirically.
This nested selection model further predicts that legal changes will have observable effects
in the “short run,” even if no changes can be observed in the long run, as the original model
predicts. Applying this methodology to Twombly, I find fairly precise zeros for the effects
of Twombly on both the grant rate of motions to dismiss and the overall rate of dismissals
among filed cases. These results support the contrarian view and the selection/no change
hypothesis, but tend to reject the conventional view and the selection/change hypothesis.
Thus, while these results do not constitute a test of the nested selection model itself—I cannot
reject both non-selection hypotheses—I can conclude that Twombly has had no effect even
accounting for the possibility that the selection of disputes changed in response to the case.
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To this result I must attach two qualifications. First, due to the limitations of my
data, the longest “long run” I can examine lasts through December 31, 2008. While I
am unable to observe changes in dismissals even when looking at the “long run,” it is
possible that the effects of Twombly will only show up beyond this window; rather than
directly changing the behavior of district courts, Twombly may have touched off a period of
evolution in the treatment of pleadings by district courts, which eventually led to plaintiffs
facing a significantly higher bar to pleadings. The methodology presented in this paper
cannot address this hypothesis.36 Nonetheless, I can say that the effect of Twombly, if it was
significant, was not immediate. This suggests something about the Supreme Court’s control
over the “lower” courts’ treatment of pleadings: at best, the lower courts’ response (if any)
to Twombly was not so much a quick shift to a higher standard, as it was a period in which
the lower courts negotiated a new standard for pleadings among themselves. Indeed, the
Iqbal decision might be seen as part of this process as well.
Second, it is quite possible that while the effect of Twombly on broad categories of
civil litigation is negligible, Twombly may have had an impact in a small subset of cases—
indiscernable to the empirical analysis used in this paper but perhaps important nonetheless.
The opinion in Twombly expressed grave concerns about the cost of litigating low-merit, high-
stakes class actions. Perhaps if Twombly tipped the balance in favor of granting a motion
to dismiss in only a handful of cases that, by some criteria, fell into this category, this was
exactly the effect the Supreme Court intended. Of course, it is also possible that Twombly
has had dramatic effects on very different types of cases; in either event, such an effect, if it
exists, would have to be concentrated among a very small number of cases.
With these caveats, this paper strongly rejects the view the Twombly constitutes a major
change in how district courts have applied the law of pleading. (Why it has had no effect is
a question for another paper. See Hubbard 2011.)
The nested selection model in this paper is a first step toward a new, more empirically
36Further, the results in this paper do not address the impact, if any, of the Iqbal decision.
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tractable theory of the litigation process. I will close by noting some potential next steps.
First, it may be fruitful to generalize this model to other stages of litigation, including
summary judgment and trial. Second, in this paper, I abstract away from the process by
which parties may gain information in each stage of litigation. This is an essential feature of
litigation—indeed, it is the purpose of discovery—and ultimately any selection model should
help explain this process. Watanabe (2009) takes a notable step in this direction. Finally, an
unstated premise of Priest and Klein (1984) and all subsequent selection models (including in
this paper) is that, in essence, there is one court in which the plaintiff can file if the dispute
does not settle. The reality, at least in the United States, is that many disputes can be filed
as lawsuits in either state court or federal court, or in one of several state courts. This issue
of forum choice has been carefully studied through the lens of personal jurisdiction, federal
jurisdiction, and conflict of laws, but ignored by selection models. I leave to future work
the possibility that accounting for forum choice may change the predictions of the nested
selection model or open up new possibilities for measuring legal change in a multi-jurisdiction
environment.
Model Appendix
6.1 The Selection of Disputes for Filing
Take a given category of dispute, defined in terms of subject matter, amount at stake (which
I will call J), etc. For this category, the factual characteristics of any given disputes can be
summarized in a single index of case quality, i.e., how strong the plaintiff’s case would be,
relative to the governing legal standard(s), were the case litigated in court. Call the quality
of a given dispute Y . The distribution of all disputes (within the given category) is F (Y ).
Call the corresponding density function of case quality f(Y ).37
37Treating F (Y ) as a distribution implies a normalization of the total number of disputes to 1.
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There is a set of legal standards governing how the court will decide contested motions
and how the court (or jury) would ultimately decide who prevails at trial. For this paper,
I concentrate on a single stage of litigation, the motion to dismiss, and deal only abstractly
with subsequent stages of litigation. Call the legal standard for granting a motion to dismiss
S. If a lawsuit is filed, and the defendant files a motion to dismiss, the court will dismiss the
case if the case quality Y is lower than the dismissal standard S and will deny the motion
otherwise.
Before a dispute becomes a lawsuit, the (potential) plaintiff and (potential) defendant
may settle the dispute. The parties to the dispute will look ahead to litigation and estimate
their chances of success, based on the dismissal standard S and all of the other applicable
legal standards (call this set Q). The legal standard for the plaintiff to prevail in litigation is
then summarized by V = v(S,Q). V is the minimum case quality Y such that the plaintiff
will prevail if the case is litigated. Of course, the application of legal rules to the facts of
any given case (or vice versa) is uncertain ex ante, and so the parties to the dispute do not
know the standard V with precision (nor do they know S precisely).
Each party forms an estimate Vˆi of V with some error:
Vˆi = V − i (3)
where i = p, d indicates the (potential) plaintiff or (potential) defendant, and the error
terms p and d are independent, normally distributed random variables with zero mean
and identical standard deviations σ.
38 The parameters of the error terms are known to the
parties. Each party, at the time of the settlement decision, has an unbiased (but different)
estimate of the true case quality relative to the liability rule. With Vˆi, each party forms an
38Identical standard deviations is a convenience; to the extent that relaxing this assumption affects the
analysis, I note it below.
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estimate Pi of the probability that the plaintiff will prevail in litigation:
Pi = Pr(Y > V |Vˆi) = Φ
(
Y − Vˆi
σ
)
(4)
The parties have the opportunity to settle the case rather than litigate. The judgment the
plaintiff would receive if successful in court is J , and the cost of litigation (net of the cost
of settlement) to each of the parties is Ci.
39 These values are common knowledge to the
parties. The plaintiff is willing to settle for any amount at least as great as his expected net
judgment in litigation. Hence, his “asking price” A is
A = PpJ − Cp (5)
The defendant is willing to settle for any amount up to her expected net costs in litigation.
Her “bidding price” B is
B = PdJ + Cd (6)
The model assumes that so long as B ≥ A, i.e., there exists a settlement amount acceptable
to both parties, then the parties will settle. If we define C = Cp +Cd, then the condition for
litigation is the familiar “Landes-Posner-Gould” condition:
Pp − Pd > C
J
(7)
Cases that satisfy this condition will make up the population of filed lawsuits. Note that in
addition to the requirement that the parties no mutually agreeable settlement amount exist,
the model assumes that a plaintiff will only file suit if it has positive expected value (PEV).
In the context of the selection of disputes for filing, the PEV condition is PpJ − Cp > 0,
39Note that my description of the model does not separately address the possibility of settlement after
filing. Of course, settlement after filing is in practice a very common outcome. This model allows parties to
account for the possibility of settling after filing; expectations about post-filing settlement simply adjust Cp,
Cd, and J .
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which is always satisfied if the Landes-Posner-Gould condition is met. Hence, we need not
discuss the PEV condition further here.
To derive the distribution of case quality among filed lawsuits, first note that conditional
on Y and p, Equations (4) and (7) imply that the probability that a given dispute becomes
a filed lawsuit is given by
Pr(file|Y, p) = Pr
(
Pp − Pd > C
J
)
= Pr
(
Φ
(
Y − V + p
σ
)
− Φ
(
Y − V + d
σ
)
>
C
J
) (8)
Solving for the distribution of case quality among filed cases (call this G(Y )) yields
G(Y ) =
∫ Y
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
Φ
(
V − y
σ
+ Φ−1
[
Φ
(
y − V + x
σ
)
− C
J
])
dΦ
(
x
σ
)
dF (y) (9)
Note thatG(Y ) is not a probability distribution, in the sense that it has a density function
g(Y ) that integrates to 1. Instead, g(Y ) would integrate to the share of all disputes that
are filed lawsuits. (Recall that F (Y ), the distribution of disputes, is a proper distribution
and reflects a normalizing of the number of disputes to 1.) For convenience, I will abuse
terminology somewhat and refer to g(Y ) as the “density function” of quality among filed
disputes.
Because the distribution of case quality among all disputes F (Y ) is unobserved, the pre-
cise shape of the distribution of case quality among filed cases is also unknown. Nonetheless,
for a broad range of possible distributions F (Y ), the selection effects are sufficiently strong
that the general characteristics of G(Y ) can be described with some confidence. Even for
underlying distributions that are highly skewed and have very little mass near the legal
standard V , the distribution of Y is approximately normal with a mean near V .40
40If parties’ uncertainty about V is not symmetrical, i.e., if σ is not the same for both parties, the
distribution of filed cases will be shifted to the left if plaintiff’s uncertainty is greater, and shifted to the
right if defendant’s uncertainty is greater.
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If F (Y ) is uniform, then G(Y ) looks like a normal distribution with mean V . This yields
the strong form of the Priest and Klein hypothesis, at least as applied to all filed lawsuits,
rather than trials: of the cases that are filed, plaintiffs will win half. (A skewed distribution
F (Y ) would shift the plaintiff win rate away from zero.) Waldfogel (1995) and Siegelman
and Waldfogel (1999) implicitly test the result that quality among filed cases is normally
distributed (though not necessarily centered on V ), because the versions of the model they
test assume a normal distribution of case quality. Their results support the model.
Before turning to the selection of filed lawsuits for litigation on a motion to dismiss (the
nested selection process), I will take stock of my model so far. I have applied the logic of
Priest and Klein (1984) to the decision to settle a dispute or file a lawsuit. This accounts for
the empirical reality that many (I would say the vast majority) of disputes are settled without
a lawsuit ever being filed.41 Leaving unspecified the (unobserved) distribution of case quality
among all disputes, I have been able to characterize, at least in general terms, the distribution
of the subset of disputes that become filed cases. The prediction that the quality of filed
cases will be concentrated around the legal standard V goes beyond Priest and Klein (1984),
who assume that the distribution of filed cases may take any shape; and it diverges from
Priest (1985), Wittman (1985), and Siegelman and Donahue (1995), who assume that all or
nearly all present expected value (PEV) disputes are filed. Indeed, contrary to Priest (1985)
and Wittman (1985), whose reasoning implies that the highest-expected-value disputes are
the disputes most likely to become lawsuits, my model predicts that they are among the
least likely disputes to become lawsuits.
41Evidence on the number of all disputes relative to litigated disputes is hard to come by. In some contexts,
one way to characterize the set of disputes is to compare the number of all injury claims made to an insurer
against the number of such injuries that become the subject of a lawsuit. Conard et al. (1964), in a seminal
study of automobile accident injury claims, find that about 5 percent of all injuries become the subject of
litigation. Also, the Landes-Posner-Gould condition (equation (7)) predicts that likelihood of a filed lawsuit
rises with the amount at stake, i.e., the injury, and this is precisely what the data indicate. Conard et al.
(1964) report that 27 percent of injuries over $25,000 (in 1958 dollars) lead to lawsuits, but only 2 percent of
smaller injuries do. Black et al. (2008), using data on commercially insured personal injury claims, do not
measure lawsuit filing rates, but compare total claims to claims ending in fully litigated trials, and find that
claims involving injuries over $25,000 (in 1988 dollars) are about 10 times more likely to end in a lawsuit
and trial than smaller claims. Note that only 0.26 percent of all claims in the Black et al. (2008) data ended
in a trial.
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One thing that this new model cannot do (so far) is budge the negative prediction of
the original selection model: a change in a legal standard that changes V will lead to no
unambiguous prediction about the rate at which cases are filed, or the share of cases won
by plaintiffs. Say that there is an upward shift in V . A new distribution of filed cases will
emerge, but because we cannot observe F (Y ), the number of filed cases and the share that
plaintiffs will win could in principle rise, fall, or stay the same.
6.2 The Selection of Disputes for Dismissal
Among filed cases, the first major decision the parties generally face is whether to litigate
a motion to dismiss or not. If the defendant files a motion to dismiss, the parties litigate
the issue and the court dismisses the case if case quality Y is below the dismissal standard
S. How does the motion to dismiss standard S relate to the ultimate success threshold
V ? Litigation of a motion to dismiss is the first stage of litigation and one which only the
defendant can win. Plaintiffs who prevail at the motion to dismiss stage may go on to win
or lose at a later stage of litigation. Thus, since plaintiffs who meet the threshold S may fail
to meet the threshold V , it must be the case that S is a lower threshold that V .42 Indeed,
given the many stages of litigation that occur after a motion to dismiss—such as discovery,
summary judgment, and trial—we would expect that S is much lower standard than V . And
this is generally how lawyers perceived the standard for a motion to dismiss—at least until
Twombly.
The parties are uncertain about the application of the pleading standard to the facts of
their case, so they form estimates:
Sˆi = S − ei (10)
where the plaintiff’s and defendant’s errors are ep and ed, respectively. Among all disputes,
I assume that ep and ed are each independent and normal with mean zero and standard
42Of course, as noted above, V may depend on S.
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deviation σe. It is important to note that σe will be smaller than σ. This is because the
outcome of a motion to dismiss depends only on the facts alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint
and the judge’s application of the law to those facts; the outcome of a fully litigated lawsuit,
however, depends not only on the plaintiff’s allegations, but the defendant’s allegations
(which come after the motion to dismiss), the evidence produced by the parties, the testimony
of witnesses, and the judge’s (and possibly a jury’s) perceptions of all of these, not to mention
the judge’s application of the law not only to the plaintiff’s allegations, but questions of
evidence and procedure. Hence, parties’ uncertainty about the overall litigation outcome
should be much greater than uncertainty about the outcome of a motion to dismiss.43
With Sˆi, each party forms an estimate P
MTD
i of the probability that the plaintiff will
prevail on the motion to dismiss:
PMTDi = Pr(Y > S|Sˆi) (11)
As the defendant has the option to file, the roles of the parties are reversed, but otherwise
the analysis of the selection process proceeds as above. There will be a subset of filed cases
in which the parties litigate a motion to dismiss, and the quality Y of these cases will tend
to be concentrated around the dismissal standard S. The rest of the cases will “settle.”
Here it is important to note what “settlement” entails in this context. In the context
of this (or any) selection model, settlement is any agreement between the parties to save
the costs of litigation by avoiding litigation. Here “litigation” specifically means a motion
to dismiss and the “costs of litigation” are specifically the costs of litigating a motion to
dismiss. Thus, settlement is not limited to settling the case before a motion to dismiss is
filed (although this in fact happens); it can include the decision to simply forgo the issue
(which implies a settlement of zero) and move forward with the litigation.
43However, because V = v(S,Q), we might expect ep to (positively) covary with p and to allow ed to
(positively) covary with d. Whether this is so does not affect the discussion below.
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The defendant will settle for any amount less than she expects to pay if she does file a
motion to dismiss. Her “bidding price” BMTD is
BMTD = PMTDd J
MTD
d + C
MTD
d (12)
where CMTDd is the defendant’s cost of litigating the motion to dismiss, and J
MTD
d is the
defendant’s belief about the plaintiff’s expected judgment, conditional on the motion to
dismiss being denied.44 Analogously, the plaintiff will settle for any amount more than he
expects to receive if the defendant files a motion to dismiss. His “asking price” is
AMTD = PMTDp J
MTD
p + C
MTD
p (13)
The condition for settling, rather than litigating a motion to dismiss, is BMTD ≥ AMTD.
Thus, just as was the case for the selection of disputes for filing, there are two conditions for
filing a motion to dismiss. First, there must not be a mutually agreeable settlement amount
that would forestall a motion to dismiss. No such settlement exists if BMTD < AMTD.
Second, a motion to dismiss must have positive expected value (PEV) for the defendant.
Unlike in the selection of disputes for filing, in the case of the selection of disputes for
dismissal, the first condition does not imply the second. (When the plaintiff is deciding
whether to file suit, his outside option is receiving nothing. But when the defendant is
deciding whether to file a motion to dismiss, her outside option is the expected cost of
moving on to subsequent stages of litigation.)
Both of these conditions will limit the number of motions to dismiss that get filed. How-
ever, unlike in the selection of disputes for filing, where the PEV condition was redundant,
44In the first (filing) stage, I assume a known amount J that is in dispute. The amount the plaintiff
“wins” if a motion to dismiss is denied, however, is the expected value of his judgment (conditional on
surviving a motion to dismiss, but with other stages of litigation remaining). This depends both on J and
on each party’s expectation of plaintiff’s likelihood of ultimately prevailing (again, conditional on surviving
the motion to dismiss). Because of the selection of disputes into filed cases, the parties’ beliefs about the
plaintiff’s expected gain from surviving a motion to dismiss will diverge. Hence, I call these beliefs JMTDi
for party i.
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here the PEV condition is likely to be more important in limiting the number cases with
litigated motions to dismiss. Why? The relevant universe of disputes in which a motion to
dismiss may be filed is the set of all disputes in which a lawsuit is filed. As discussed above,
filed lawsuits are disputes in which each party is relatively optimistic about its chances of
prevailing at trial. This implies that the defendant’s belief about plaintiff’s expected judg-
ment (JMTDd ) will be lower than plaintiff’s belief about his expected judgment (J
MTD
p ). Add
to this the fact that the cost of litigating a motion to dismiss may be small relative to the
amount at stake, and there may be a large number of cases for which BMTD < AMTD; i.e.,
no settlement range exists.
On the other hand, filed lawsuit also tend to be disputes where true case quality Y is
close to the victory standard V . This means that Y is far above the standard for a motion
to dismiss S. Consequently, both plaintiff and defendant are likely to recognize that any
given case—conditional on being a filed lawsuit—is very unlikely to have case quality below
S. In other words, PMTDd is very close to one, and even if a motion to dismiss is not very
expensive, it is unlikely to have positive expected value. Only in the handful of filed lawsuits
with true case quality near S will a defendant perceive the likelihood of a motion to dismiss
succeeding to be much above zero. In plain English, if the parties know that the court is
going to deny the motion, the defendant will save her money and move on.
In short, the distribution G(Y ) of case quality among filed cases implied by my model
suggests that motions to dismiss will be rarely filed. S is necessarily below V , and the
selection of disputes for filing predicts that the case quality of filed cases will be concentrated
around V . Thus, a relatively small fraction of cases—only those with case quality near S—
will see motions to dismiss. Figure 1 illustrates this. The broken line is the density g(Y ) of
case quality among filed cases, and the solid line indicates the distribution of case quality in
the subset of cases in which a motion to dismiss is litigated (call this distribution is H(Y );
again, this is not a probability distribution).
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Data Appendix
6.3 AO Data Processing
The AO data are compiled and published as public-use database files by the Federal Judicial
Center (FJC) and made available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political and
Social Research (ICPSR)45 entitled Federal Court Cases: Integrated Data Base. See FJC
2005a-d, 2006a-b, 2007, 2009a-b, 2011.
My processing of the AO Data includes the following steps: I begin with the civil ter-
minations files for SY 1970-2009, and the 2008 pending cases file.46 I drop all observations
litigated in non-Article III district courts (these are district courts for U.S. territories; all
district courts in U.S. states are included in the sample). The excluded courts correspond
to district > 90 in the AO Data. I drop all observations in which the jurisdictional basis is
“local question” (jurisdiction = 5), a code that should only apply in territorial courts and
to the District of D.C. before the creation of the D.C. Superior Court in 1970. For the same
reason I drop observations coded with a “local question” nature of suit (natureofsuit = 910,
920, 930, 940, or 992). The code natureofsuit = 990 (“other”) is ambiguous as to whether
it applies only to local question cases; I retain these observations. I calculate a new variable
duration, case duration in days, by subtracting filedate from termdate. I drop all observa-
tions with negative duration. (Note that observations with zero duration are not, as a rule,
errors. Cases can be filed and terminated in the same day, often as a result of previously
negotiated settlement.) I drop observations coded as “Land Condemnation” cases (progress
= 0).
For SY 1972-1978, disposition data is missing, so I drop all observations either filed or
45See http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/.
46For SY 1970-1991, the AO used a July-to-June reporting period; e.g., SY 1986 covered July 1, 1985
through June 30, 1986. During SY1992, the AO changed from a July-to-June reporting period to an October-
to-September period that conformed to the federal government’s fiscal year. SY 1992 covers a 15-month
period. All years beginning with SY 1993 run October-to-September.
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terminated on or before June 30, 1978. I drop all observations (other than pending cases)
with missing values for disposition.
I drop a number of nature of suit categories that are either inconsequential or that
reflect peculiar (both in terms of content and timing) types of litigation. These include
“State reapportionment,” i.e., congressional redistricting litigation, which spikes every 10
years (natureofsuit = 400); “Parole Board Review,” a quasi-criminal nature of suit code
discontinued in 1985 (natureofsuit = 520); “Welfare Pension Plans,” of which there is only
1 after 1980 (natureofsuit = 750); “Selective Service,” which was bunched in the early 1970s
(natureofsuit = 810); “Black Lung,” which is clustered around 1976-1981 (natureofsuit =
862); and “Appeal of Fee,” which is trivial in number and different in kind from actions
originating in the district court (natureofsuit = 900).
I drop actions (by the government) to recover student loans, overpayments of benefits, and
the like, which as Hadfield (2005, 2004) notes usually involves uncontested actions that are
not in fact litigated but end in default judgments (natureofsuit = 150, 151, 152, 153). I drop
observations (n = 55) with missing nature of suit codes or with values for natureofsuit that do
not correspond to any nature of suit code values in the codebooks for the AO Data. I recode
the discontinued value “Antitrust-Electrical Equipment” as “Antitrust” (natureofsuit = 410).
I combine various discontinued codes labeled “Deportation” into the current “Deportation”
code (natureofsuit = 461), and various discontinued codes labeled “Bankruptcy” into the
current “Bankruptcy” code (natureofsuit = 422).
I ensure all codes for district, office number, and docket number are numeric values,
replacing alphanumeric values with unused, unique, numerical values when necessary. These
codes are used to generate identifiers for each unique federal civil case. I generate dummy
variables identifying various categories of suits. See Table A1. As reported in Table A1, a
number of categories are excluded from the reported specifications. These include categories
outside of (what might be called) the “typical” forms of civil litigation described in the main
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text. For example, I exclude habeas corpus petitions, which are essentially criminal matters,
and social security cases, which are essentially appeals from administrative proceedings.
Further, reported results exclude cases with a pro se or in forma pauperis party. Shortly
after Twombly, the Supreme Court issued a per curiam opinion that appeared to limit the
application of Twombly to pro se cases. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (June 4,
2007) (per curiam) (“A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed . . . and a pro se
complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.”). Reported results also exclude categories of cases involving
unusual spikes in filings, such as cases in the Eastern District of Louisiana (due to Hurricane
Katrina) and nature of suit categories involving “mass filings” (i.e., more than 1000 cases
filed in a single day in a single district). I exclude cases in multi-district litigation (MDL)
proceedings; these cases are often terminated (including dismissed) in batches of hundreds
or thousands. I exclude fraud (including securities fraud) cases, as these cases involved
explicitly heightened pleading standards even before Twombly. See Rule 9(b); 15 USC §78u-
4(b). Finally, I exclude cases involving the review of arbitral awards(disposition = 15, 16
or progress = 13), appeals to a district court (diposition = 19, 20), and bankruptcy stays
(variously coded, depending on year), all of which are procedurally unique.
For computing dismissal rates, I exclude all observations in which the disposition is
a transfer to a new district (including multi-district litigation (MDL) transfers). I exclude
cases for which no opportunity arose for a motion to dismiss; given my definition of dismissal,
these are cases with duration ≤ 45. For the same reason, I drop cases that were disposed of
on grounds that are procedurally antecedent to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, such as dismissals
for want of jurisdiction, dismissals for want of prosecution, default judgments, remands of
removed cases to state court, and remands to U.S. agencies.
I also account for double counting of cases in the raw data. If a single case is closed and
reopened (this can happen multiple times) or transferred to another district (including for
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an MDL proceeding), that case will appear as multiple observations in the AO data, even
though there has been only a single opportunity for the case to be terminated because of
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss (setting aside exceptions which can be ignored for my
purposes). For example, many cases coded as being “dismissed,” are in fact being dismissed
“without prejudice,” i.e., the plaintiff can refile the lawsuit at any time. (This is often done
when the parties are negotiating a settlement. Upon reaching an settlement, the parties
reopen the case in order to obtain a final judgment dismissing the case “with prejudice.”)
To address double counting, I de-duplicate case records in the data. For each unique case,
as identified by each unique combination of district, office, and docket number, I collapse
all observations for that case into a single observation. (About 6 percent of cases had
duplicate observations.) For these cases, I retain the first-filed observation (as determined
by filing date), but create new fields to capture the termination date, procedural progress,
prevailing party, and disposition codes from the last-terminated observation (as determined
by termination date). The variable duration is calculated as the difference between the first
filing date and the last termination date.
Notably, in more than 99 percent of cases with multiple observations, time-invariant
variables, such as jurisdictional basis and nature of suit code, had no discrepancies across
observations for the same case. This suggests a high degree of reliability in the data. Also,
although some studies have found high error rates in the coding of some fields in the AO
Data (see Eisenberg and Schlanger 2003; Hadfield 2004), the accuracy of the fields describing
case characteristics essential to this paper (such as the jurisdiction, dates of filing and dis-
position, etc.) has never been questioned, and Hadfield (2005) finds the key outcome field,
emphdisposition, to be fairly reliable.47
As discussed in the main text, the disposition field does not distinguish between Rule
47Based on audits using docket records of a sample of cases, Hadfield (2005) finds that the “Judgment on
motion before trial” code corresponds to final judgments on motions before trial (presumably either Rule
12(b)(6) or Rule 56 motions) in 85-90 percent of cases and the “Judgement: Settled” code corresponds to
settlements in approximately 95 percent of cases.
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12(b)(6) motions to dismiss and Rule 56 motions for summary judgment. To identify Rule
12(b)(6) dismissals, I first exclude cases coded (in the judgmentfor field) as terminated in
favor of plaintiff. I then consider the duration of the case at termination. When a plaintiff
files a complaint with the court, the plaintiff must also serve the complaint on the defendant.
A defendant has 20 days from the date of service or, if the defendant waives the requirement
of service, 60 days from the mailing of the request for waiver of service to file a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion. See Rule 12(a)(1). Upon filing of a motion to dismiss, the court typically sets a
briefing schedule, with perhaps 30 days to file a response in opposition to the motion, and
30 days beyond that for filing a reply in support of the motion. After briefing, the court
may schedule a hearing (again, perhaps within 30 days) at which the parties can argue the
motion. Thereafter, unless the case has settled, the court will grant or deny the motion.
Given this timeline, I would expect that a contested Rule 12(b)(6) motion is unlikely to be
granted immediately after the case is filed. Conversely, unless a large number of deadline
extensions are granted, or the court is slow to decide the motion, a motion to dismiss is
relatively unlikely to terminate a case 9 or 12 months after filing. As noted in the main text,
the duration window of 45-224 days accommodates this rough timetable and is consistent
with published studies of case duration at time of ruling on a motion to dismiss.
On the other hand, a Rule 56 motion requires that parties have completed sufficient
discovery to present evidence demonstrating the presence or absence of factual disputes in
the case. Thus, a Rule 56 motion necessarily comes after a Rule 12(b)(6) motion (if one is
filed), and usually many months (or years) into a case, depending on the breadth of discovery.
For this reason, I assume that Rule 56 motions are decided 225 or more days into a case.
This recoding of the AO Data yields summary statistics (not reported, available from
author) consistent with earlier studies of the rates at which cases were terminated due to
Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss or Rule 56 motions for summary judgment. See Williging
(1989); Cecil et al. (2007). In any event, as noted in the main text, my reported results are
robust to variations in the time frame used to define a termination based on a motion to
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dismiss in the AO Data.
6.4 Opinions Data Processing
The Opinions Data is derived from a data set collected by Lee Epstein, William M. Landes,
and Richard A. Posner. Each observation in this data set represented a published judicial
opinion ruling on a motion to dismiss. For each observation, the data set provided the
Westlaw citation of the opinion, the month and year of the opinion, the district in which the
case was decided, an indicator for whether the case was a civil rights case (based on subjective
coding criteria), an indicator for whether the opinion granted the motion to dismiss in its
entirety, as well as a number of other fields not used herein.
I took the following steps to process the data: I removed duplicate observations from the
data set and then divided the remaining observations among myself and my research assis-
tants by random assignment. Each opinion was then retrieved from Westlaw and the exact
date of the opinion, as well the district, office, and docket number information was recorded.
The date and district information was then cross-checked against the corresponding fields
in the data set and discrepancies were resolved. Additional duplicate observations identi-
fied during this process were dropped as well. In less than 1 percent of cases, observations
referring to the same opinion (i.e., what I have called “duplicate observations”) contained
different codes for whether the motion to dismiss was granted in full or for whether the case
was a civil rights case. All such observations were dropped from the data set.
This yielded a data set of 12,717 unique opinions. Results using this data set are reported
in the main text. This configuration of the data set makes it most comparable to previous
studies on the effect of Twombly on the rate at which motions to dismiss are granted.
In order to check the reliability of the coding in this dataset and to generate results more
comparable to results based on the AO Data, I then reorganized the data set by unique
case identifier (given by district, office, and docket number) rather than Westlaw citation.
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Some cases had more than one opinion on Westlaw; for these cases, information about the
multiple opinions was collapsed into a single observation. Conversely, some opinions dealt
with more than one case (this happened in the case of consolidated cases, including multi-
district litigation). For these opinions, multiple observations were created, each with the
same opinion-specific information, and one observation assigned to each unique case.
Once in this configuration, this data set could be merged with the AO Data by matching
on unique case identifier. Of the 13,031 observations generated by this process, more than
98 percent (all but 242) were successfully matched with observation in the AO Data. By
matching the Opinions Data to the AO Data, I can check for consistency across those codes
that are common to both datasets; despite the fact that the Opinions Data was coded
by hand, approximately 98 percent of all observations in the matched Opinions Data have
identical values for those fields that also appear in the AO Data.48 This indicates a high
level of reliability, particularly for a hand-collected and hand-coded data set.
I then drop all observations excluded from all specifications using the AO Data (see Table
A1) and all observations (n = 83) in which there were opinions published both before and
after Twombly. Matching the Opinions Data with the AO Data also allows me to compare
the date on which a motion to dismiss is granted in the Opinions Data to the date on which
a case is terminated in the AO Data. From this, I calculate the fraction of cases terminated
within 90 days of the granting of a motion to dismiss.
Finally, I re-run the specifications for the Opinions Data using this reconfigured version
of the data. All of the results are qualitatively identical to those reported in Table 4 in the
main text, and in fact all point estimates for the effect of Twombly are closer to zero.
48Nonetheless, there still remains the possibility of measurement error leading to some attenuation bias in
the results. As the outcome variable is a dummy (generally for whether the case was terminated by a Rule
12(b)(6) dismissal), the estimated β will depend on both the covariance of the true disposition with X and
the covariance of the measurement errors with X. And because the disposition variable can take only two
values, one or zero, measurement errors will systematically vary with X in the opposite direction that the
true disposition varies with X.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Motions to Dismiss and Dismissals
Nested Selection Model
S V
Note: Dashed curve represents the distribution of case quality Y among filed cases. Solid
curve represents the distribution of filed cases in which a motion to dismiss is litigated.
Shaded region indicates the set of cases dismissed. V is the overall threshold for plaintiff
success. S is the pleading standard. (Height of solid curve is exaggerated for clarity. Even
near S, only a fraction of filed cases have litigated motions to dismiss.)
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Figure 2: Motions to Dismiss and Dismissals
under Higher Pleading Standard S ′, Short Run
S S' V
Note: Dashed line represents the distribution of case quality Y among filed cases. Solid line
represents the distribution of filed cases in which a motion to dismiss is litigated. Shaded
region indicates the set of cases dismissed. V is the overall threshold for plaintiff success.
S ′ indicates a new, higher pleading standard. (Height of solid curve is exaggerated for
clarity. Even near S ′, only a fraction of filed cases have litigated motions to dismiss.)
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Opinions Data
28 
 
TABLE XX: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR OPINIONS DATA 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Citations Subset 
Dockets 
Subset 
Short Run 
Subset 
     
Civil Rights Opinions 2,230 2,148 2,103 
Pre-Twombly Dismissal Rate 0.569 0.572 0.574 
     
Civil Rights Opinions 2,379 2,320 1,549 
Post-Twombly Dismissal Rate 0.583 0.584 0.555 
     
Non-Civil Rights Opinions 3,851 3792 3,705 
Pre-Twombly Dismissal Rate 0.466 0.472 0.472 
     
Non-Civil Rights Opinions 4,257 4,377 2,861 
Post-Twombly Dismissal Rate 0.476 0.459 0.469 
     
 
Notes: For (2) and (3), I organize cases by unique docket number rather than opinion; I omit 
cases with opinions published both before and after Twombly. Column (3) excludes cases 
filed after May 21, 2007. See Data Appendix. 
 
 
TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR OPINIONS DATA 
 
  (1) (2) 
  Pre-Twombly 
Post-
Twombly 
    
Civil Rights Opinions 2,230 2,379 
 Dismissal Rate 0.569 0.583 
    
Non-Civil Rights Opinions 3,851 4,257 
 Dismissal Rate 0.466 0.476 
    
Total Opinions 6,081 6,636 
 Dismissal Rate 0.504 0.515 
    
 
Note: See Data Appendix for sample construction and processing. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Summary of Predictions from Competing Hypotheses
1 
 
TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF SHORT RUN PREDICTIONS FROM COMPETING HYPOTHESES 
 
 Conventional 
Contrarian; 
Selection/No Change 
Selection/Change 
1. MTD Grant 
Rate + 0 0 
2. Dismissals as 
Fraction of 
Filed Cases 
+ 0 + 
 
Notes: “SR” and “LR” indicate “short run” (composition of filed cases fixed) and “long run” 
(composition of filed cases allowed to respond endogenous to treatment), respectively. “+” 
and “–” indicate significantly positive or negative changes in response to the treatment. “0” 
indicates little or no change. “?” indicates that the hypothesis makes no clear prediction. 
 
 
  
Note: “+” and “-” indicate significantly positive or negative changes in response to the
treatment. “0” indicates little or no change.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for Administrative Data
9 
 
 
 
 
TABLE XX: UMMARY TATISTICS FOR FILINGS SUBSAMPLE 
 
  Year Beginning May 22 
  2005 2006 2007 
     
All Cases Filings 85,606 83,770 82,682 
 Dismissal Rate 0.014 0.015 0.013 
     
Civil Rights Filings 22,762 21,485 21,193 
 Dismissal Rate 0.016 0.016 0.013 
     
Shares Tort 0.068 0.066 0.066 
 Contract 0.260 0.266 0.269 
 Civil Rights 0.266 0.256 0.256 
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Table 4: Opinions Data Regression Results
31 
 
 
 
Notes: All errors clustered at the district level. One and two asterisks denote statistical 
significance at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
 
 
TABLE XX: SHORT RUN SUBSAMPLE RESULTS: 
DISMISSAL EFFECT 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Model Linear Linear Linear Logit Linear Logit 
Twombly 
-0.0089 
(0.0131) 
-0.0112 
(0.0132) 
-0.0109 
(0.0130) 
-0.0112 
(0.0133) 
-0.0170 
(0.0207) 
-0.0173 
(0.0210) 
Can Reject 
at p = 0.05 
Effect of 
0.0127 0.0105 0.0105 0.0107 0.0171 0.0172 
Civil Rights   
0.1015** 
(0.0199) 
0.1037** 
(0.0201) 
NA NA 
Circuit 
Dummies 
 Y Y Y Y Y 
Scope All All All All 
Civil 
Rights 
Civil 
Rights 
Constant 
0.5082** 
(0.0186) 
0.6985** 
(0.0059) 
0.6508** 
(0.0099) 
 
0.7061** 
(0.0099) 
 
N 10,288 10,288 10,288 10,288 3,652 3,652 
 
 
Notes: All errors clustered at the district level. One and two asterisks denote statistical 
significance at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
  
Notes: All errors are clustered at the district level. One and two asterisks denote statistical
significance at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. Logit coefficients are reported as
marginal effects, evaluated at sample mean. Reported values for the constant in regressions
with circuit fixed effects reflect the mean in the omitted circuit (DC). The Twombly
variable is an indicator for cases in which ruling on a motion to dismiss (if any) occurred
after the date of Twombly (May 21, 2007). “Civil Rights” is an indicator for a civil rights
cases. “Scope” denotes whether all cases, or only civil rights cases, were included in a given
specification. “NOS” stands for “Nature of Suit.”
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Table 5: AO Data Regression Results, All Cases
19 
 
 
TABLE XX: FILINGS SUBSAMPLE RESULTS: 
DISMISSAL SR EFFECT 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Model Linear Linear Linear Logistic 
Twombly 
-0.0023 
(0.0022) 
-0.0024 
(0.0022) 
-0.0024 
(0.0022) 
-0.0021 
(0.0020) 
Can Reject  
at p = 0.05 
Effect of 
0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 0.0011 
Constant 
0.0187** 
(0.0020) 
0.0187** 
(0.0014) 
0.0208** 
(0.0029) 
 
NOS Dummies   Y Y 
Circuit 
Dummies 
 Y Y Y 
N 17,223 17,223 17,223 17,223 
 
 
Notes: All errors clustered at the district level. One and two asterisks denote statistical 
significance at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
 
 
TABLE XX: FILINGS SUBSAMPLE RESULTS: 
DISMISSAL SR EFFECT, CIVIL RIGHTS CASES 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Model Linear Linear Logit 
Twombly 
-0.0027 
(0.0041) 
-0.0027 
(0.0040) 
-0.0021 
(0.0030) 
Can Reject  
at p = 0.05 
Effect of  
0.0040 0.0039 0.0029 
Constant 
0.0192** 
(0.0034) 
0.0192** 
(0.0029) 
 
Circuit 
Dummies 
 Y Y 
N 4,853 4,853 4,853 
Note: See notes following Table 4.
Table 6: AO Data Regression Results, Civil Rights Cases
19 
 
 
TABLE XX: FILINGS SUBSAMPLE RESULTS: 
DISMISSAL SR EFFECT 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Model Linear Linear Linear Logistic 
Twombly 
-0.0023 
(0.0022) 
-0.0024 
(0.0022) 
-0.0024 
(0.0022) 
-0.0021 
(0.0020) 
Can Reject  
at p = 0.05 
Effect of 
0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 0.0011 
Constant 
0.0187** 
(0.0020) 
0.0187** 
(0.0014) 
0.0208** 
(0.0029) 
 
NOS Dummies   Y Y 
Circuit 
Dummies 
 Y Y Y 
N 17,223 17,223 17,223 17,223 
 
 
Notes: All errors clustered at the district level. One and two asterisks denote statistical 
significance at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
 
 
TABLE XX: FILINGS SUBSAMPLE RESULTS: 
DISMISSAL SR EFFECT, CIVIL RIGHTS CASES 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Model Linear Linear Logit 
Twombly 
-0.0027 
(0.0041) 
-0.0027 
(0.0040) 
-0.0021 
(0.0030) 
Can Reject  
at p = 0.05 
Effect of  
0.0040 0.0039 0.0029 
Constant 
0.0192** 
(0.0034) 
0.0192** 
(0.0029) 
 
Circuit 
Dummies 
 Y Y 
N 4,853 4,853 4,853 
Note: See notes following Table 4.
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Table 7: AO Data: Trends in Dismissals in Longer-Duration Cases
20 
 
 
 
Notes: All errors clustered at the district level. One and two asterisks denote statistical 
significance at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
 
 
TABLE XX: FILINGS SUBSAMPLE RESULTS: 
DISMISSAL SR EFFECT, EMPLOYMENT CASES 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Model Linear Linear Logit 
Twombly 
-0.0029 
(0.0056) 
-0.0030 
(0.0056) 
-0.0028 
(0.0052) 
Upper Bound 
of 95% CI 
0.0082 0.0082 0.0073 
Constant 
0.0124** 
(0.0044) 
0.0125** 
(0.0043) 
 
Circuit 
Dummies 
 Y Y 
N 2255 2255 1786 
 
 
TABLE XX: FILINGS SUBSAMPLE RESULTS: 
LATER-DISMISSED CASES 
 
 Filed During Period Ending 
 May 21, 2006 May 21, 2007 
Share Dismissed  
within 365 Days 
0.0349 
(8,919) 
0.0354 
(8,304) 
Mean Duration,  
Dismissed Cases 
210.9 
(311) 
219.1 
(294) 
   
Share Dismissed  
within 590 Days 
0.0655 
(8,919) 
0.0625 
(8,304) 
Mean Duration,  
Dismissed Cases  
330.8 
(584) 
329.3 
(519) 
 
Note: Frequencies appear in parentheses. 
 
Note: Frequencies appear in parentheses.
Table A1: Nature of Suit Recodes
 
TABLE A1: NATURE OF SUIT RECODES 
 
 
Recode Category   AO Nature of Suit Codes 
Contract  100-196, excluding 191 
Real Property  220-230, 290 
Torts (excl. Fraud)  310-362, excluding 330, 340, and 360 
Fraud (incl. Securities)  371, 850 
Antitrust  410 
Civil Rights  440-446 
Other 
 191, 210, 330, 720-791, 820-840, 875-
890, 895, 950, 990, excluding 750 
Mass Filing Categories  340, 360, 365, 368, 370, 380, 710 
Other Categories 
Excluded in Reported 
Specifications 
 
240-245, 385, 422, 423, 430, 450, 460-
490, 610-620, 630-660, 870, 871, 891-
894, 625, 690, 970, 860-865, excl. 862, 
510-555, excl. 520 
Excluded in All 
Specifications 
 
150-153, 400, 520, 750, 810, 862, 900 
 
  
60
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Readers with comments should address them to: 
 
Professor William H. J. Hubbard 
University of Chicago Law School 
1111 East 60th Street 
Chicago, IL  60637 
 whubbard@uchicago.edu 
  
Chicago Working Papers in Law and Economics 
(Second Series) 
 
For a listing of papers 1–550 please go to Working Papers at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html 
 
551. Douglas G. Baird, Car Trouble, May 2011  
552. Omri Ben-Shahar, Fixing Unfair Contracts, May 2011 
553. Saul Levmore and Ariel Porat, Bargaining with Double Jeopardy, May 2011 
554. Adam B. Cox and Richard T. Holden, Reconsidering Racial and Partisan Gerrymandering, May 
2011 
555. David S. Evans, The Antitrust Economics of Free, May 2011 
556. Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Precaution, June 2011 
557. Omri Ben-Shahar and Anu Bradford, Reversible Rewards, June 2011 
558. Alon Harel and Ariel Porat, Commensurability and Agency: Two Yet-to-Be-Met Challenges for 
Law and Economics, June 2011 
559. Randal C. Picker, After Google Book Search: Rebooting the Digital Library, June 2011 
560. Julie A. Roin, Privatization and the Sale of Tax Revenues, July 2011 
561. Joseph Issenbergh, Last Chance, America, July 2011 
562. Richard H. McAdams, Present Bias and Criminal Law, July 2011 
563. David Weisbach, Is Knowledge of the Tax Law Socially Desirable?, July 2011 
564. Louis Kaplow and David Weisbach, Discount Rates, Judgments, Individuals’ Risk Preferences, 
and Uncertainty, July 2011 
565. Louis Kaplow, Elisabeth Moyer and David A. Weisbach, The Social Evaluation of 
Intergenerational Policies and Its Application to Integrated Assessment Models of Climate 
Change, July 2011 
566. David A. Weisbach, Carbon Taxation in Europe: Expanding the EU Carbon Price, July 2011 
567. Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg, Hybrid Judicial Career Structures: Reputation v. Legal 
Tradition, August 2011 
568. Richard A. Epstein, F. Scott Kieff, and Daniel F. Spulber, The FTC’s Proposal for Regulationg IP 
through SSOs Would Replace Private Coordination with Government Holdups, August 2011 
569. Dhammika Dharmapala, Nuno Garoupa, and Richard McAdams, Do Exclusionary Rules Convict 
the Innocent?  August, 2011 
570. Andres Sawicki, Better Mistakes in Patent Law, August 2011 
571. Jonathan S. Masur and Eric A. Posner, Regulation, Unemployment, and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 
August 2011 
572. Adam B. Cox and Eric A. Posner, Delegation in Immigration Law, September 2011 
573. Joseph Bankman and David Weisbach, A Critical Look at a Critical Look—Reply to Sanchirico, 
September 2011 
574. M. Todd Henderson and Frederick Tung, Pay for Regulator Performance, September 2011 
575. William H. J. Hubbard, The Problem of Measuring Legal Change, with Application to Bell 
Atlantic v. Twombly, September 2011 
